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Monopolies appear throughout health care markets, as a result of patents, limits to the extent of the
market, or the presence of unique inputs and skills.  In the health care industry, however, the deadweight
costs of monopoly may be small or even absent.  Health insurance, frequently implemented as an ex
ante premium coupled with an ex post co-payment per unit consumed, effectively operates as a two-part
pricing contract.  This allows monopolists to extract consumer surplus without inefficiently constraining
quantity.  This view of health insurance contracts has several implications:  (1) Low ex post copayments
to insured consumers substantially reduce deadweight losses from medical care monopolies -- we calculate,
for instance, that the presence of health insurance lowers monopoly loss in the US pharmaceutical
market by 82 percent; (2) Price regulation or break-up of health care monopolies may be inferior to
laissez-faire or simple redistribution of monopoly profits; and (3) Promoting efficiency in the health
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A.  Introduction 
Optimal health insurance contracts balance risk-sharing against the need for efficient 
utilization incentives (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970).  This balance explains why 
such contracts do not entitle policyholders to unlimited utilization, but instead charge an ex post unit 
price or co-payment.  Co-payments reduce insurance, but in return produce fewer distortions in the 
goods market, because the consumer faces a private price that partially reflects social cost. 
In addition to the trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives, health insurance contracts 
have another aspect that is less well-appreciated:  consumer surplus-extraction.  Health insurance 
resembles a two-part pricing contract, in which a group of consumers pays an upfront fee in 
exchange for lower prices in the event of illness.  It is well understood that such two-part pricing 
contracts allow a monopolist to sell goods at marginal cost, but extract consumer surplus in the form 
of an additional payment (see the seminal paper by Oi, 1971).  In the context of health insurance, 
marginal cost co-payments allow a firm to extract the maximum possible consumer surplus, because 
there is no deadweight loss to consumers.  Therefore, a firm with market power and access to a two-
part health insurance contract has strong incentives to treat this contract as a two-part pricing scheme.  
In effect, the uncertainty of health care demand, coupled with ex ante or ex post asymmetric 
information, creates a contractual structure that facilitates the efficient extraction of consumer 
surplus.  Moreover, while copayments exactly equal to marginal cost represent an ideal case, the 
actual practice of health insurance arrives fairly close to such an equilibrium. 
This logic is robust to a wide variety of contexts.  It applies directly when a monopolist or 
oligopolist health-care provider is integrated with a health insurer.  In this case, the health-care 
provider directly uses the two-part insurance contract to extract surplus.  Two prominent examples of 
this vertically integrated corporate form are:  a staff-model Health-Maintenance Organization 
(HMO); and a pharmaceutical innovator integrated with a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) that 2 
manages prescription drug insurance.  However, these incentives also operate on the relationship 
between a monopolist health-care provider and a separate health insurance industry.  If insurance is 
competitively provided, a monopolist can use its market power to induce insurers to extract 
maximum consumer surplus on its behalf.  This surplus-extraction is made possible by the two-part 
pricing tools at the insurers’ disposal.  Even if insurance is not competitive, both insurers and 
providers have strong incentives to maximize the consumer surplus available for extraction, which 
they then split amongst themselves.  Finally, the core intuition is robust to common failures in the 
insurance market, like moral hazard and adverse selection.  Regardless of the information structure, 
firms have incentives to maximize the consumer surplus available for extraction.  The inefficiency of 
the insurance market lowers the total surplus available, not incentives to maximize extractible 
surplus. 
Our results have several important and novel implications.  First, monopolies in health care—
whether due to patents, limited market size, or historical factors—may have smaller or even no 
deadweight costs in the goods market.  As an important example of how the theoretical arguments 
influence actual practice, we calculate that the presence of health insurance lowers deadweight loss in 
the US pharmaceutical market (where patent monopolies are prevalent) by 82%.  In the particular 
context of prescription drugs, patent protection stimulates innovation at much less static deadweight 
cost than in other markets.
1  Two-part health insurance has dynamic benefits, because it allows more 
efficient surplus-extraction by innovators. 
Second, market power may lead to higher than competitive insurance premia, but it should 
not affect co-payments and utilization, which are predicted to be driven by marginal costs, and 
                                                   
1 The need for patents and the difficulties of encouraging innovation are well-understood 
(Nordhaus, 1969; Wright, 1983).  The efficiency of paying innovators consumer surplus has implications 
for cost-effectiveness analysis, which should account for the need to reward innovation (Pauly, 2005; 
Philipson and Jena, 2006). 3 
possibly the incompleteness of information.  When coupled with efficient co-payments, higher 
premia merely redistribute, without affecting the allocation of goods.  Society could undo this 
redistribution, if it desired, by taxing the profits of the monopolist and redistributing to consumers.  
This scheme would neither improve nor detract from efficiency.  In contrast, directly regulating 
monopolists cannot improve efficiency and can sometimes harm consumers. 
Finally, our analysis provides some guidance for the optimal design of public health 
insurance benefits, which ought to set co-payments at or below marginal cost, and set insurance 
premia according to society’s particular redistributive goals. 
We develop our argument by analyzing four progressively less ideal contexts.  As a 
benchmark, we begin with first-best efficiency in Section B, where all consumers are identical ex 
ante, and all ex post heterogeneity is fully observable.  We consider both an integrated insurer-
provider, and the separation between providers and insurers.  Section C extends the argument to the 
context of innovation, where two-part health insurance pricing yields first-best utilization in the 
goods market and (in the presence of competitive insurers)
2 first-best innovation.  Sections D, E, and 
F show how the argument generalizes even in the presence of moral hazard, monopolistic 
competition among health-care providers, and adverse selection in insurance.  Section G presents our 
estimate of deadweight loss reduction in the US pharmaceutical market.  Section H concludes with 
several implications for health care policy. 
B.  Two-Part Health Insurance and Surplus-Extraction 
Any insurer who can charge both a premium ex ante and a co-payment ex post has enough tools to 
extract maximum consumer surplus and ensure efficient utilization of the good.  This point can be 
                                                   
2 Garber, Jones, and Romer (2006) analyze the impacts of subsidizing the insurance market, 
which leads to more than first-best innovation. 4 
made most simply in the context of a full information model, where there is neither moral hazard nor 
adverse selection.  Our initial setup is very similar to that of Gaynor, Haas-Wilson, and Vogt (2000), 
who show that imperfect competition in healthcare markets does not reduce deadweight losses from 
moral hazard in insurance. 
We begin with the most standard setup of full information and indemnity insurance.  From 
the ex ante perspective, consumers face a risk of illness, and an uncertain demand for a medical 
remedy.  The medical remedy is produced at constant marginal cost equal to MC .  An insurance 
contract is an offer of an ex post co-payment (m ), coupled with indemnity transfers  ) (t .  In this 
simplest full information case, the indemnity transfers can be conditional on the consumer’s health 
state.  As such, ex post co-payments are not strictly necessary, because the insurer could write 
contracts characterized entirely by a set of indemnity payments and pre-specified medical care 
quantities.  Co-payments in this case may result in a simpler contractual form, but they are equivalent 
to contracting on quantity.  However, the analysis of this simple case helps set the analytical stage for 
our discussion of incomplete information. 
Suppose there are consumers of measure one, indexed by  ] 1 , 0 [ Î h , and distributed uniformly 
over this interval.  Consumer health is represented by this index h, which is a random variable 
unknown ex ante, but revealed to the consumer after the insurance contract is purchased.  Ex post 
consumer utility depends on non-medical consumption, the quantity of medical care consumed (q), 
and the revealed health state, according to  ) , , ( h q c u . 
Since information is complete here, it sacrifices no generality to assume that there are just 
two states:  sickness and health.  The consumer is sick with probability s .  Utility in each state is 
given by 
s u  and 
h u .  The marginal utility of medical care is positive when sick, but zero when 
healthy.  The marginal utility of consumption is higher in the healthy state. 5 
Ex post, a sick consumer with wealth W  and the health insurance contract  ) , , (
h s m t t  solves 
the following problem: 
  ) , ( max q mq I W u
s s
q t + - -   (1) 





W u m u =   (2) 
This first-order condition implicitly defines the ex post demand for medical care as a function of ex 
post disposable income, the co-payment, and health, according to  ) , (
* m I W q
s t + - . 
B.1  Competitive Outcomes 
If a consumer faces a competitive insurance industry and a competitive goods market, the outcome is 
first-best.  This is our benchmark case; we will show that a monopolist with access to a two-part 
health insurance contract will replicate its outcomes.  The medical care sector sells its goods at the 
constant marginal cost of production, and (since information is complete), there is also a competitive 
insurance market that offers indemnity coverage at actuarially fair prices. 
The equilibrium in this market is straightforward.  Consumers buy full indemnity insurance at 
actuarially fair prices, and, when sick, purchase the innovation at marginal cost from the competitive 
goods-producing sector.  The following three conditions obtain: 




W u u = ; 
2.  Efficient use of medical care, where, consumers face price equal to the marginal cost of 
production  MC p = ; 
3.  Zero profits for insurers and medical-providers. 6 
B.2  The Impact of Monopoly 
In the presence of a two-part pricing contract for health insurance, monopoly does not change 
the equilibrium price or co-payment for medical care.  Its only impact is to charge an actuarially 
unfair premium that is used to extract consumer surplus.  If consumers own the monopolist in 
proportion to their premia, this has no impact on the allocation or distribution of resources, because 
the extracted surplus does not make them poorer.  If not, a simple tax-and-transfer scheme, without 
any pricing regulation, can redistribute surplus to achieve the competitive allocation. 
The simplest way to understand this is to consider an integrated monopolist who provides 
both health care and insurance.  In addition to being pedagogically useful, such vertical relationships 
are not uncommon in the health care industry. For example, Kaiser Permanente, a staff-model HMO, 
controlled one-third of the California HMO market in 2004 (Baumgarten, 2005).  Similarly, a 1999 
FTC study found that drug companies owned or had a significant affiliation with PBMs that account 
for majority of the PBM activity. Indeed, in 1994 independent PBMs accounted for less than 30% of 
prescriptions (Levy, 1999).
3 
The monopolist maximizes profits subject to the consumer’s participation constraint.  The 
amount of surplus the monopolist can extract depends on the consumer’s next available outside 
option.  Without loss of generality, suppose there are no other firms available to supply health care or 
insurance of any kind.
4  Therefore, the reservation utility level 
) 0 , ( ) 1 ( ) 0 , ( p s p s + - + + = W u W u U
h s  is utility under autarky, where firm profits are p , and we 
                                                   
3 Since 1994 some pharmaceutical companies have divested their stock holdings in PBMs, but 
still maintain strategic interests in them (Martinez, 2002). 
4 Changing this assumption affects only the level of rents earned by the firm, which we show 
below to be (largely) neutral in this problem. 7 
assign ownership of the firm to consumers.  This results in the profit-maximization problem for the 
monopolist: 
 
U W u q mq W u t s
q MC m
h h s s
s h
h s
³ + - - + + + -
- - + -
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This problem has the following first-order conditions (simplified by using the consumer’s optimality 
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  (4) 
The utilization of medical care is identical to the first-best if the monopolist sets the copayment equal 
to marginal cost. 
Intuitively, price equals marginal cost, because this strategy maximizes the consumer surplus 
available for extraction.  The following arguments formalize this intuition.  Suppose that  MC m > .  
Define 
* q , 
* s t , 
* h t , and 
* m  as the contract values in the initial (putative) equilibrium.  Consider the 
alternative insurance contract that sets m  equal to MC .  It is easy to verify that the new contract 
increases ex post consumer surplus by more than  ) (
* * MC m q - .  Therefore, there exists some 
) (
* * MC m q - > e e e e  such that the consumer strictly prefers the contract 
* * ( , , )
s h MC t e t -  to 
) , , (
* * * m
h s t t .  Moreover, the new contract is strictly more profitable than the old one, because the 
reduction in the indemnity transfer  ) (e  exceeds the value of the revenue lost from the price 
reduction,  ) (
* * MC m q - .  The existence of the alternative contract contradicts the initial 
equilibrium.  
Now suppose  MC m < .  Define 
* q , 
* s t , 
* h t , and 
* m  as the contract values in this putative 
equilibrium.  Consider the alternative insurance contract that sets m  equal to MC .  It is easy to 8 
verify that, when the copayment rises to MC , the consumer’s loss in surplus is strictly less than 
) (
* * m MC q - , as long as the demand for medical care is downward-sloping.  Therefore, there exists 
some  ) ( '
* * m MC q - < e e e e  such that the consumer strictly prefers the contract  ) , , ' (
* * MC
h s t t t t e e e e t t t t +  to 
) , , (
* * * m
h s t t .  The marginal cost contract is strictly more profitable for the firm than the old one, 
because in the initial equilibrium the firm is losing  ) (
* * m MC q -  on sales.  The existence of the 
alternative contract thus contradicts the initial equilibrium.  Therefore,  MC m = . 
Since the monopolist sets the co-payment equal to marginal cost, the first-order conditions 
for 
s t  and 




W u u = . 
Finally, profits must be positive, because the participation constraint binds.  Suppose, to the 
contrary, that profits are zero.  This implies that the consumer’s utility will be equal to that of 
autarky, which is lower than in the first-best equilibrium.  If profits are zero and utility is lower than 
under competition, the competitive allocation offers higher total surplus.  The monopolist should thus 
be choosing a different allocation.  The equilibrium contract under monopoly can now be 
summarized as: 




W u u = ; 
2.  Consumers face the price equal to the marginal cost of production  MC p = ; 
3.  Positive profits for the monopolist-insurer, by means of actuarially unfair premia; 
There is one remaining result to show:  the monopoly allocation is Pareto-equivalent to the 
competitive allocation.  In particular, when consumers own the firm, monopoly produces the same 
level of consumer utility as competition.  Define 
* p  as the equilibrium level of monopoly profit.  
The problem in 3 can be equivalently rewritten as: 
 
* *
* * * *
,
) ( ) 1 ( . .
) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( max
p st s t s
p t s p t s
t t
³ - - + -
+ - - + + + -
s h
h h s s
q MC m t s
W u q mq W u h s
   9 
Now observe that this problem is the same as maximizing the following over  ) (
* p t -
h  and 
) (
* p t +
s : 
 
0 ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( . .
)) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ), ( ( max
* * *
* * * *
) ( ), (
* *
³ + - - + - -
- - - + + + -
- +
p t s s p t s
p t s p t s
p t p t
s h
h h s s
q MC m t s
W u q mq W u h s
   
This is just the competitive insurer’s problem, of choosing transfers that maximize consumer utility 
subject to a zero profit constraint.  The consumer’s maximum utility will thus be identical to that 
under competition. 
B.3  Separating the Insurance- and Goods-Producers 
The preceding analysis demonstrated the use of health insurance contracts as a means of 
surplus-extraction by considering a single firm that provided both insurance and goods.  Such a 
model is directly relevant for vertically integrated firms like staff-model HMO’s, or pharmaceutical 
firms integrated with PBM’s, but its results also apply to markets where insurance and health-care 
provision are separated.  Analytically, we consider the case of a monopoly goods-provider interacting 
with a competitive insurance market.  Later, we discuss how the results generalize to the case of 
bilateral monopoly between an insurer and goods-producer.  Both these cases produce efficient 
outcomes.  If consumers receive all the firms’ rents in proportion to their utilization of the good, the 
monopoly distribution of resources is identically equivalent to the competitive distribution.  If not, 
simple tax-and-transfer schemes can produce an equivalent outcome without regulating the goods 
market. 
The representative insurer faces a monopolist selling the good.  In negotiating with the 
insurer, the monopolist is able to specify both a price and a quantity, or equivalently, a quantity and a 
total fixed fee.  This type of contracting is often observed in health care markets, where quantities are 
either explicitly named (e.g., by a pharmaceutical wholesaler), or tied to a nonlinear price schedule 10 
(e.g., in the form of quantity discounts, rebates, and the like).  For example, contracts between PBMs 
and pharmaceutical firms are of two types – non-capitated and capitated.
5  Non-capitated contracts 
usually specify a list price or “wholesale acquisition costs” and terms for determining discounts or 
rebates.  Rebates are usually tied to the dollar or unit sales of a particular drug product.  For example, 
growth rebates offer PBMs a steeper discount if they achieve certain volume targets. Capitated 
contracts, on the other hand, specify a fixed payment from the PBM to the drug company per insured 
member per month, along with some risk-sharing arrangement that determines additional payments 
or concessions based on actual drug usage (Levy, 1999).  The capitated rates combined with risk-
sharing arrangements effectively render these equivalent to two-part pricing contracts.  Similarly 
complex pricing arrangements are also common between hospitals and insurers (Melnick, 2004). 
The ability to set both a price and a quantity is important.  When the monopolist is able to 
specify only one of these, we revert to the analysis of monopoly articulated by Gaynor, Haas-Wilson, 
and Vogt (2000), where the usual societal losses are incurred.
6  Specifying both prices and quantities 
for heterogeneous consumers is quite impractical in the absence of two-part health insurance. The 
provider would need to specify a different price-quantity pair, or two-part pricing menu for each of 
these heterogeneous consumers.  The two-part structure of health insurance provides a natural and 
practical way to do so. 
The insurer takes as given a fixed quantity and a fixed fee associated with that quantity.  
Since he is competing for a contract from a monopolist, he must maximize his gross profits — gross 
                                                   
5 Private-sector entities that offer prescription drug insurance coverage, such as employers, labor 
unions, and managed care companies, often hire pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to manage these 
insurance benefits. PBMs engage in many activities to manage their clients’ prescription drug insurance 
coverage including assembling a network of retail pharmacies, designing the plan formulary and cost 
sharing arrangements (co-payments for different drugs) and negotiating with pharmaceutical companies. 
6 They show that even in the presence of moral hazard, consumers are better off with competition 
(lower prices) than with monopoly (higher prices). 11 
of the fee paid to the monopolist — subject to the participation of the consumer.  Given the pre-
specified quantity 
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Associating the multipliers m m m m  and h h h h  with the two constraints, respectively, this problem has the 
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Note that these first-order conditions are identical to the case of the integrated insurer, except that 
MC  is replaced by h.  The envelope theorem implies that  sh sh sh sh =
* dq
dG
, the change in expected profits 
associated with an increase in the monopolist’s offer of quantity.  Since the monopolist can extract all 
gross profits, he will equate this marginal change to the expected marginal cost of output,  MC s s s s , 
making these first-order conditions identical to those of the integrated case. 
Formally, the monopolist selling quantity 
* q is able to charge a fee equal to  ) (
* q G .  
Therefore, the profit-maximizing monopolist solves: 
  q MC q G
q s s s s * ) ( max
*
* -   (7) 
The first-order condition for this problem implies that  MC q G s s s s = ) ( '
* , or that  MC = h h h h .  As a result, 
this equilibrium is identical to that produced by the integrated insurer. 
C.  Innovation Incentives 
A major reason for monopolies in health care is the use of patents to encourage innovation.  
While patents improve dynamic efficiency, two well-known sources of dynamic and static 12 
inefficiency remain (Shavell and van Ypersele, 1998).  First, incentives to invest in research remain 
inadequate, because monopoly profits are less than the social surplus created by the innovation.  
Second, patents encourage innovation at the expense of static inefficiency from monopoly loss.  
Two-part health insurance can solve both these problems in health care markets – it limits static 
inefficiency by subsidizing medical care, and at the same time delivers social surplus to a monopolist 
in the form of the extracted premium.  Thus, it can produce better dynamic incentives for innovation, 
even while it decreases the static costs associated with encouraging innovation.  The only danger 
arises not from patent protection, but from failure in the insurance market:  if health insurance is 
inefficiently cheap or over-provided (due, for example, to government subsidies), the result will be 
excessive amounts of innovation (Garber, Jones, and Romer, 2006). 
C.1  The Efficient Allocation 
It is well-known that competition does not produce first-best outcomes with innovation.  
Therefore, to calculate the efficient allocation we must solve the Pareto problem.  In addition to the 
structure developed earlier, suppose that the good in question must be developed through research.  
Society can spend resources r  on the research process, and the probability of discovering the new 
good is  ) (r r .  
N U  is maximum utility without the invention.  The first-best efficient allocation 
solves the following (equal weights) Pareto problem: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) r W r q MC c c r t s
U r c u q c u r
h s
N h h s s
q c c r
h s
- £ + - +
- + - +
) ( * ) 1 ( ) ( . .
)) ( 1 ( ) 0 , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( max
, , ,
r s s s r
r s s r
  (8) 
Conditional on the innovation being discovered, the efficient allocation shares all the features of the 
first-best competitive equilibrium without innovation:  full insurance and utilization up to the point 13 
where marginal benefit equals marginal cost.
7  Formally, we can characterize it using the following 
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The third condition, unique to the innovation problem, stipulates that the marginal value of investing 
in innovation is equal to its marginal opportunity cost. 
C.2  The Monopoly Allocation with Two-Part Health Insurance 
Above, we showed that the vertical integration of insurer with goods-producer had little 
impact on the allocation, provided that monopolists can engage in nonlinear pricing.  Therefore, we 
analyze this problem in the expositionally simpler context of the integrated insurer-producer-
innovator.  Defining the innovator’s ex post profits (in the event of discovery) as 
d p , and assuming 
consumers own the firm, the integrated innovator solves the problem: 
  ( )
U W u q mq W u t s
r q MC m r
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t t   (10) 
U  is maximum utility for the consumer who chooses not to contract with the innovator.  This 
formulation assumes that in the absence of discovery, the firm is simply a competitive insurer 
earning zero profit.  Conditional on discovery, this firm faces the same problem as the integrated 
insurer in Section B.  It shares all its first-order conditions, but adds an equilibrium condition for 
innovation, as follows: 
                                                   
7 Since we are considering the case of a single innovation, we rule out the possibility of insuring 
against the failure to innovate, which would require the possibility of transferring resources across the 
“innovation” and “no innovation” states. 14 
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By the same arguments made in Section B, we can show that  MC m = .  This will then imply full 
insurance, according to the first-order conditions for 
s t  and 
h t .  This implies that, conditional on 
discovery, the provision of insurance and the invented good are Pareto-optimal.  It remains to show 
that investment in research is also efficient. We will do so by showing that the private return to 
innovation equals the social return. 
  The private return to innovation is the ex post return earned by the innovator, or  r
d + p .  On 
the other hand, the social return to invention is the total (monetized) gain enjoyed by consumers as a 
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Taking first-order approximations to  ) 0 , (
d s W u p +  and  ) (
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This demonstrates equality between the private and social returns to innovation. 15 
C.3  Subsidies for Employer Provided Insurance 
The analysis above considered an unregulated, unsubsidized, and competitive insurance 
market. In practice, however, employer-based health insurance premia are implicitly subsidized, 
because they are tax-exempt.  This affects the optimal level of the insurance premium generally, 
along with the incentive to innovate, but it does not affect the optimal copayment, or static efficiency 
in the goods market. 
If consumers face less than the full price of insurance, monopolists will be able to extract 
consumer surplus plus the value of the premium subsidy.  However, monopolists will continue to 
have incentives to set the co-payment so as to maximize extractible consumer surplus.  The result is 
that premium subsidies or taxes affect dynamic efficiency, but not static inefficiency, which the 
monopolist has incentives to maintain. 
As Garber, Jones, and Romer (2006) have argued, this logic suggests that premium subsidies 
lead to over-innovation.  If the innovator can extract total surplus, in addition to the value of the 
premium subsidy, the return on innovation is too high relative to first-best.  The result is too much 
innovation, but efficient provision of the innovations that exist.  Notice that we continue to have the 
result that two-part pricing erases static losses from monopoly, even in the context of innovation. 
D.  Moral Hazard 
The presence of moral hazard is largely responsible for inducing the two-part structure of health 
insurance.  This makes it important to show that moral hazard does not change the implications we 
have developed.  Absent any other market failures, moral hazard leads to a second-best equilibrium.  
Monopoly with two-part health insurance also achieves this competitive outcome. 
  Studying the moral hazard problem requires incorporating some additional consumer 
heterogeneity.  We continue to assume that consumers are indexed by  ] 1 , 0 [ Î h , and distributed 
uniformly over this interval.  We also keep the assumption that the fraction s  fall sick, or all 16 
consumers for whom  s £ h .  Sick consumers place value on the medical care good, while healthy 
consumers do not.  Therefore, insurers can easily distinguish healthy from sick patients.  However, 
information on the severity of illness is incomplete.  Patients with lower values of h are sicker, but 
the insurer cannot observe this.  Therefore, even though they may benefit from more insurance than 
the less ill patients, there is no way for the insurer to make payments contingent on actual underlying 
health state.  Payments can only be contingent on the consumer’s observed decision to purchase the 
medical good or not.  It is impossible to insure all consumers fully.  The result is a second-best 
solution, where the insurer charges co-payments below marginal cost.  This results in “over-
utilization” relative to the first-best, but this is a welfare-enhancing means of delivering some 
additional insurance in the face of informational incompleteness. 
D.1  The Typical Competitive Problem 
Consider a representative competitive insurer purchasing medical care from a competitive 
goods market selling at marginal cost, and providing insurance within the informational structure 
outlined above.  The firm chooses a co-payment and premium that maximizes consumer utility, 
subject to a break-even constraint, and incentive compatibility for the consumer.  The insurer knows 
the quantity of medical care demanded by consumer h, given the co-payment and income, according 
to  ) , , ( h m I W q - . 
In this case of heterogeneous consumers, we adopt the simplifying convention that 
consumers either purchase one unit of the medical good, or none at all.  That is, consumers vary 
along the extensive margin only.  The firm’s optimization problem can be written as: 
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These first-order conditions illustrate the standard trade-off between risk-bearing and 
incentives in the presence of moral hazard.  The left-hand side of the first order condition for m  
always exceeds the left-hand side of the condition for I , because  W u  and 
* q  are decreasing in h.
8  
This fact, coupled with the two first-order conditions, implies that 
  0 ) (
) (
) (










MC m   (15) 
and that  MC m < .  In turn, this implies that the marginal utility of wealth will be higher than in the 
first-best, according to the first-order condition for insurance. 
  Intuitively, the only way to provide insurance in this limited information case is to induce 
over-utilization by charging the consumer a price below marginal cost.  Therefore, the benefits of 
insurance must be traded off against the cost of inducing distortion in the goods market.  This leads 
to:  (1) Over-utilization relative to the first-best, (2) Higher marginal utility of wealth relative to first-
best, and (3) Incomplete insurance.  Competitive markets deliver the second-best efficient allocation 
that maximizes consumer well-being, subject to the economy’s information constraints. 
                                                   
8 Intuitively, ￿ - -
1
0 ) , , (
) (
dh h q mq I W u
q E
q
W  is a weighted average of  W u , where more weight 
is placed on its larger values. 18 
D.2  Two-Part Health Insurance with Monopoly 
Two-part health insurance eliminates deadweight losses associated with monopoly, but it cannot 
solve the intrinsic informational problems that lead to moral hazard in this environment.  As a result, 
a monopolist with access to two-part health insurance pricing will choose an allocation of resources 
that is second-best efficient, just like the competitive allocation, but he cannot solve the underlying 
informational problem. 
Consider an insurer who is also a monopoly provider of the good with uncertain demand.  
We consider an existing good, rather than an innovative one, although the extension to innovation is 
straightforward.  The insurer maximizes profits subject to a reservation utility condition for the 
consumer.  Define U  as the level of utility the consumer would attain if he refused the insurance 
contract and failed to consume the medical care good.  However, he may still have a claim on the 
firm’s profits if he is a shareholder.  The insurer thus solves: 
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It is straightforward to prove the mechanical equivalence between this problem and the competitive 
one, so long as consumers own the firm.  Formally, if we define p  as the equilibrium monopoly 
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Substituting in the reservation profit constraint allows us to rewrite this as: 
  , ) , ), ( * )) ( ( ( max
1
0 ￿ - - - dh h q q E MC q E q m W u m   (18) 
which is exactly equivalent to the displaced version of the problem in 13. 19 
  A more informal but also more illuminating proof demonstrates exactly why the monopolist 
chooses to solve the second-best Pareto problem.  The reservation utility condition can be first-order 
approximated by: 
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where CS  is monetized consumer surplus.  In words, the monopolist can extract in total revenues no 
more than gross consumer surplus from use of the good.  Therefore, the monopolist’s problem under 
two-part health insurance pricing is equivalent to: 
  )) , , ( ( * ) , ( max , h m I W q E MC m I W CS m I - - -   (20) 
This is the second-best Pareto problem, which maximizes social surplus given the economy’s 
contracting constraints.  The monopolist can maximize profits by first maximizing gross consumer 
surplus, and then extracting this. 
E.  Monopolistic Competition 
So far, we have considered the case of pure uncontested monopoly.  Many health care 
markets are better approximated by monopolistic competition.  For example, two drug companies 
might hold patents on different drugs that treat the same disease.  Doctors may build unique 
relationships with their patients, who develop a preference for one physician over another.  Patients 
may prefer to go to a hospital that is closest to their home.  All these factors can create product 
differentiation in the minds of consumers.  Market power results, but it is incomplete.  In this section, 
we add monopolistic competition to the moral hazard information structure. 
Monopolistic competition changes the distribution of resources relative to complete 
monopoly, but leaves intact the result that monopolistic competitors choose quantity so as to 
maximize extractible surplus.  A monopolistic competitor must be mindful that her customers can 
defect to the other firm.  This limits the amount of surplus available for extraction.  However, 20 
conditional on consumer purchases from her, she will continue to set quantity so as to maximize their 
surplus. 
To distill the key ideas, suppose we have two monopolistic competitors—A and B—and two 
kinds of consumers, one strictly preferring A and the other strictly preferring B.  Both products have 
the same marginal cost of production.  The firms are integrated in the sense that they both produce 
their goods and provide insurance contracts over them.  Further, as with most spatial models of 
product differentiation, assume that consumers must choose to use one or the other of the products, 
but not both—these might be different drugs, physicians, or hospitals, which cannot be easily used 
with those of rivals.  Define  ) , , ( h q c u
A  as utility for consumers who prefer  A and define 
) , , ( h q c u
B  similarly.  If a consumer uses the “wrong” good, she derives utility  ) , , ( h q c u
i d , where 
1 < d .  Since each consumer can only consume one of the goods, we can assume without loss of 
generality that insurers provide two insurance contracts—one that provides good  A and one that 
provides good B . 
E.1  The Second-Best Efficient Allocation 
Clearly, the efficient allocation provides each consumer with her preferred good, and its 
associated insurance contract.  Goods are sold at marginal cost to the insurer.  Each contract 
maximizes the utility of the consumer, subject to the break-even constraint of the insurer.  As before, 
the insurer knows the quantity of good  j  demanded by a consumer of type  j  in health state h, 
given the co-payment and income, according to  ) , , ( h m I W q
j - . 
The optimal contract for the type  j  consumer maximizes: 
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The insurer sets a co-payment below marginal cost, in an effort to provide some insurance. 
E.2  Equilibrium with Monopolistic Competition 
The key difference between monopolistic competition and the earlier case of pure monopoly 
is in the consumer’s reservation utility level.  The pure monopolist had only to guarantee the 
consumer as much utility as she could derive without consuming any medical care goods.  The 
monopolistic competitor, on the other hand, has to guarantee the utility she could derive from the 
competitor’s contract.  As with most models of oligopoly, this reservation utility level depends on the 
absence, presence, and nature of strategic behavior between competitors.  However, this does not 
affect the marginal valuation of goods, only the level of profit earned by the firm.  The division of 
resources among the two firms and the set of consumers have no impact on efficiency.  Indeed, if 
type  j  consumers own firm  j , all profits extracted are returned to the consumers from which they 
were taken.  The result is the same equilibrium observed under pure competition. 
Without loss of generality, we will demonstrate this reasoning for firm  A.  Define 
) , , ( h m I W q
B B BA -  as the amount of good B  that consumer  A will use when offered the good B  
insurance contract.  Firm  A then solves: 22 
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  (23) 
The decisionmaking of the other firm only enters insofar as it affects the consumer’s reservation 
utility level.  If consumers own their respective firms, this will not even affect the distribution of 
resources. 
  Arguing as we have several times earlier, define 
A p  as the optimal level of profit that solves 
the firm’s problem.  The problem in 23 can be equivalently written as: 
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The displaced version of this problem is identical to the displaced version of the competitive problem 
in 21.  This demonstrates that monopolistic competition produces the same allocation as pure 
competition. 
F.  Adverse Selection 
The basic logic of health insurance as two-part pricing also holds up under another common 
failing of insurance markets — adverse selection.  As in the case of moral hazard, two-part pricing 
cannot remove the deadweight loss associated with asymmetric information, but it does remove all 
the incremental deadweight loss associated with monopoly.  In other words, a monopolist with access 
to the two-part contract will do just as well as a competitive market, in the face of asymmetric 
information. 23 
To model adverse selection, suppose that consumers are heterogeneous ex ante.  There are 
chronically ill patients (type c), and not chronically ill patients (type n).  Firms cannot observe 
consumer types.  Define  ) (h
c m  and  ) (h
n m  as the distributions of chronically ill and not chronically 
ill people.  The health distribution for the chronically ill is assumed to dominate the other in the first-
order stochastic sense.  An insurance contract is an ex ante insurance premium  ) (I , coupled with an 
ex post copayment  ) (m . 
F.1  The Competitive Solution 
  A pooling equilibrium is not possible for the usual reasons (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976):  
given any putative pooling equilibrium, there is always a profitable contract that attracts only the 
low-risk insureds.  Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, it must be a separating equilibrium.  As such, 
the competitive insurance industry chooses two contracts that maximize the welfare of each type of 
agent, subject to incentive compatibility constraints (ensuring the contracts are chosen by the correct 
agents), and break-even constraints.  The contract  ) , (
c c I m  for the chronically ill solves: 
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Notice that if the incentive constraint fails to bind, these first-order conditions are identical to the 
second-best equilibrium with moral hazard. 
  This observation reveals how the adverse selection equilibrium is affected by the introduction 
of moral hazard.  In the absence of moral hazard, full insurance is the benchmark outcome.  Full 
insurance is never incentive-compatible, because high-risk consumers always prefer the full 
insurance contract offered to the lower-risk, lower-cost consumers.  This explains why, in the 
standard Rothschild-Stiglitz setting, adverse selection always impacts outcomes.  In this case, 
however, the second-best moral hazard contracts may sometimes be incentive-compatible.  Suppose, 
for example, that the second-best contract involves a very high copayment for the low-risks, because 
they have a highly elastic demand and relatively little insurable risk.  If so, it is possible that the high-
risk insureds would prefer their own second-best contract to that offered to the low-risks.  In this 
event, adverse selection would have no impact, because incentive compatibility emerges of its own 
accord, due to moral hazard.  This would leave us with the moral hazard equilibrium outlined above.  
If, however, the second-best contracts are not incentive-compatible, we obtain the typical Rothschild-
Stiglitz solution in which the high-risk consumers receive their second-best contract, but the low-risk 
consumers receive something worse than their second-best. 
The indirect utility conferred by a specific contract is defined by  ) , ( m I v
c  and  ) , ( m I v
n  for 
the chronically ill and not chronically ill patients, respectively; these are defined as follows. 
  ￿ - - - - º
1
0 ) ( ) ), , , ( ), , , ( ( max ) , ( dh h h h m I W q h m I W mq I W u m I v q m   (27) 
We impose two assumptions that make this environment similar to the Rothschild-Stiglitz one.  First, 
the chronically ill are willing to pay more for a given change in the copayment rate, in the sense that: 
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This is the typical “single-crossing” property from Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) analysis of 
adverse selection.
9  Second, a given change in the co-payment rate has a bigger impact on a firm’s 
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  (29) 
Figure 1 illustrates the separating equilibrium in  ) , ( m I -space.  The curves 
n Z  and 
c Z  
represent the zero-profit curves for the not chronically ill and chronically ill, respectively.  
c v  is the 
indifference curve for the chronically ill tangent to the zero-profit line — this represents the optimal 
(i.e., second-best) contract that is possible under moral hazard.  Observe that if the second-best 
contract for the not chronically ill falls on the curve segment  A, there is no adverse selection 
problem, because both second-best contracts are incentive-compatible. 










= - .  First-order stochastic dominance implies that the numerator is higher for the 
chronically ill.  We assume this effect outweighs the fact that the marginal utility of wealth may also be 












Figure 1:  Equilibrium with adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Now consider the case where adverse selection has an impact:  if the second-best contract for type n 
falls on the curve segment B .  In this case, the chronically ill will receive their second-best contract, 
while the other type will receive the contract at the intersection of 
c v  and 
n Z . 
F.2  Equilibrium with Two-Part Monopoly Pricing 
A monopolist who charges an upfront premium and an ex post copayment maximizes profits 
subject to reservation utility conditions (i.e., participation constraints) and incentive constraints.   27 
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  (30) 
Since this problem is additively separable in  ) , (
c c m I  and  ) , (
n n m I , the joint profit-maximization 
problem is identical to two separate problems, in which the monopolist maximizes profits over each 
contract.  Specifically, the maximization problem in 30 is equivalent to the pair of maximization 
problems below: 
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  (32) 
As in the moral hazard case, it is straightforward to show that these problems yield Pareto-equivalent 
allocations to the competitive problems.   
  Without loss of generality, we show this for the type n contract.  To net out distributional 
effects, we assume that the representative type n consumer holds a claim on all profits that flow 
from contracts with type n consumers.  There may not be a well-defined equilibrium in the case of 
adverse selection, but for our purposes, it suffices to consider the case where an equilibrium exists.  
If no equilibrium exists, deadweight loss from monopoly is undefined.  Define 
n p  as the equilibrium 
profit associated with the solution to 32.  If so, then 32 is identical to a problem in which the firm 
maximizes consumer utility subject to a reservation profit constraint, and the incentive constraint.  
This problem will also yield profits equal to p , incentive-compatibility, and utility at least equal to 
n u : 
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Substituting the reservation profit constraint into the consumer’s objective function yields: 29 
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This problem is identical to the displaced version of the competitive problem in 25.
10  Therefore, the 
monopoly allocation is identical to the competitive one. 
G.  Deadweight Loss Reduction due to Prescription Drug Insurance 
In this section, we calculate—in a “back-of-the-envelope” fashion—how much health insurance 
lowers deadweight loss in the US market for pharmaceuticals, where patents create a considerable 
amount of market power.  Specifically, we estimate the reduction in deadweight loss that would 
obtain if we provided the average uninsured consumer with the average prescription drug insurance 
policy.  This calculation illustrates the empirical significance of our key idea – that health insurance 
can significantly reduce the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing by lowering marginal prices for 
consumers.  We abstract from moral hazard and adverse selection, in order to focus on efficiency 
losses from monopoly alone. 
To calculate the reduction in deadweight monopoly loss, we need to estimate prices and 
quantity under three scenarios: no insurance, insurance, and competitive marginal cost pricing. We 
begin with prescription drug use and expenditure data from the 1998 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS), which allows us to estimate the quantity of drugs consumed and prices faced by 
uninsured consumers.  Next, we use data on the average rate of cost-sharing for the insured 
                                                   
10 Under competition,  MC p = , and  ￿ - - =
1
0 ) ( ) ( dh h q p m I
c c c c m . 30 
population, to calculate the unit price that consumers actually face.  Estimates of the price elasticity 
of demand for pharmaceuticals then imply the quantity that would be demanded if the uninsured 
population acquired the “average” prescription drug insurance policy.  Finally, we use estimates of 
the mark-up on prescription drugs to compute the competitive marginal cost price of drugs.  
Estimates of the elasticity of demand with respect to co-payments are then used to infer the quantity 
that would prevail under marginal cost pricing.  
Data from the 1998 MEPS show that the uninsured (defined as those without prescription 
drug insurance) consumed an average of 8 prescriptions per year and faced an average price per 
prescription of $29.
11 In the same year, the average insured consumer paid 40% of the costs of 
prescription drugs out-of-pocket. In other words, if the uninsured acquired the “average” prescription 
drug insurance policy they would have paid $11.50 ($29*0.40) per prescription. Typically, long-run 
generic prices (assumed to be equal to marginal cost) are approximately 10% of the prices charged 
for the corresponding on-patent drug (Lakdawalla, Philipson, and Wang, 2006).  The standard theory 
of monopoly would then imply, based on a 90% mark-up by monopolists, a price elasticity of 
uninsured demand around 1.1, or the inverse of the markup.  Based on this price elasticity, and an 
insured price of $11.50, the uninsured would demand 13.3 prescriptions per year if they received the 
average insurance policy.  The mark-up of 90% also implies that the marginal cost per prescription is 
$2.90. The elasticity of demand at $11.50 may differ from the optimal monopoly elasticity.  
However, Goldman et al (2004) have empirically estimated this elasticity to be 0.6.  Reducing price 
from $11.50 to $2.90 would cause consumers to demand 19.3 prescriptions per year, at the point of 
marginal cost pricing. 
                                                   
11 The MEPS is a representative sample of the US civilian noninstitutionalized population; all our 
numbers reflect the behavior of this population. 31 
Using a linear approximation to the demand curve, deadweight loss associated with a 
particular change in price and quantity is simply the area of the “triangle,” or  ) )( (
2
1
q p D D - —one 
half times the reduction in price, times the increase in quantity.  Therefore, the per capita deadweight 
loss without insurance is approximately $148, obtained as  [ ] [ ]
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ dP dQ
9 . 2 29 * 8 3 . 19 * 5 . 0 - - . Similarly, the 
per capita deadweight loss with insurance would be approximately $26, or 
[ ] [ ]
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ dP dQ
9 . 2 5 . 11 * 3 . 13 3 . 19 * 5 . 0 - - . Thus, this simple calculation shows that prescription drug insurance 
can reduce the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing by more than 82%. 
H.  Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
Two-part pricing is well-known as a solution to the deadweight loss from monopoly, but it is 
frequently impractical.  In health care markets, the observed structure of insurance contracts provides 
a means for achieving the efficient outcomes associated with two-part pricing.  While it is not a 
panacea for informational problems in the insurance market, it can be an ideal solution to static 
deadweight losses from monopoly, as we have shown.  By partially decoupling monopoly profits 
from consumer prices, two-part health insurance can play an important role in the efficient delivery 
of health care, even in the presence of market power. 
A review of trends in health care markets in the late 1990’s highlights three interrelated 
trends: an increase in managed care as method of financing and delivering care; horizontal 
consolidation within insurer, hospital and physician markets and blurring of the vertical distinctions 
between these markets (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999, 2002).  Our analysis has important 
implications for analyzing the potential consequences of each of these trends. 
First, our analysis suggests that the recent increase in horizontal consolidation and market 
power of health care providers might not significantly reduce social welfare.  The optimal design of 32 
insurance contracts can limit or eliminate deadweight losses from monopoly in the goods market.   
To be sure, monopoly can change the distribution of resources, if patients are not proportionate 
shareholders.  However, society can achieve any distribution it likes — along the Pareto-frontier —
simply by taxing profits and transferring them to the appropriate consumers.  Breaking up the 
monopoly is not necessary, and neither is direct price regulation.  Indeed, the equivalence between 
the monopoly and competitive outcomes means that resources spent breaking up a monopoly or 
regulating prices leave society strictly worse off. 
Second, our analysis suggests that the rise in managed care and vertical integration of health 
care markets experienced in the 1990’s provides unique benefits to society.  In the presence of health 
insurance, deadweight loss from monopoly arises only if:  health care providers are separated from 
insurers; and providers use simple linear pricing contracts with insurers.  If these conditions obtain, 
breaking up a monopoly or oligopoly is socially desirable (as in Gaynor, Haas-Wilson, and Vogt, 
2000).  However, the same outcomes can be achieved by encouraging or requiring vertical 
integration between the monopolist and the health insurance market.  In effect, giving more vertical 
market power to a health care monopolist can actually reduce deadweight loss in this case.  From a 
positive point of view, our analysis suggests that vertical integration in health care may be motivated 
in part by the improved ability of an integrated firm to price-discriminate.  This can help to explain 
why some pharmaceutical companies have chosen to invest in pharmacy benefit managers, and why 
health-maintenance organizations integrate health-care provision with insurance. 
Innovation is of obvious importance in health care markets. Our analysis shows that two-part 
health insurance pricing also improves dynamic incentives, because it allows patent monopolists to 
extract the maximum amount of consumer surplus associated with their inventions.  The result is 
improved static and dynamic efficiency.  In this context, longer patents may have rather limited 
social costs in terms of deadweight loss from monopoly but considerable social benefits. Taken 
together, these arguments suggest that competition may do little to improve static efficiency, and that 33 
competition—even monopolistic competition—may do harm to dynamic efficiency.  An important 
caveat here, however, is that government subsidies to the insurance market can lead to over-
innovation, although optimal copayments prevent these policies from harming static efficiency. 
The design of public health insurance often considers the trade-offs among optimal risk-
bearing, moral hazard, and adverse selection.  However, our analysis suggests that it ought to 
consider how the two-part health insurance contract can best maximize social surplus.  An optimally 
designed public health insurance scheme would set co-payments at or below marginal cost 
(depending on the extent of moral hazard).  The division of resources among consumers can then be 
determined by the schedule of premia, which allows the government to extract as much or as little 
consumer surplus as it chooses. 
 34 
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